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Abstract 
This paper investigates women’s perceptions of choice and risk in the field of pensions. 
It extends on a paper published in a recent edition of this journal in which Alan 
Aldridge applied Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of cultural capital and habitus to the field of 
personal finance.  Since the late 1980s the marketisation of pensions has resulted in an 
expansion of pension options. According to Anthony Giddens the expansion of choice 
is one of the positive aspects of living in a ‘risk society’.   However, the expansion of 
pension choice has passed pension risks onto consumers. Using qualitative interviews 
this paper investigates the perceptions of 45 employed women aged 40-59 of the risks 
associated with choosing a pension. At the theoretical level the paper seeks to 
demonstrate the need to qualify notions of reflexive decision-making put forward by 
Giddens by emphasising the role of habitual action in decision-making, as put forward 
by Bourdieu.  The paper shows that material circumstances, cultural capital, extent and 
quality of pension information and habitus affect perceptions of pension choice and 
pension risks. The paper concludes that  the expansion of pension choice has been 
negative rather than positive and thus is likely to lead to increasing poverty among 
women in later life. 
 
Which Pension?: Women, Risk and Pension Choice. 
 
One of the positive aspects of living in the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) we are said to live 
in is the expansion of choice (Giddens 1998).  However, ‘choice is differentially 
distributed according to class and income’ (Giddens 1998: 30) and we can add life 
course position, gender and ethnic origin.  In this paper I use empirical data to examine 
perceptions of choice and risk in decision-making in the field of pensions.  My focus is 
on the perceptions of women in mid-life of the pension options available to them, 
because research shows that women are less likely than men to have access to all 
pension options (Ginn and Arber 1993, Groves 1991, Walker 1992).  Since we live in a 
moral climate where we are expected to make choices and assume responsibility for 
our fate (Smart 1999), and where we take increasing responsibility for our own welfare 
(Aldridge 1998), an analysis of perceptions of pension risks and the management of 
those risks is worthy of attention.  
The idea of risk is linked with thoughts of controlling the future and making it 
safe (Giddens 1998).  The majority of women and men in the UK expect to retire, but 
how they save for retirement is, by all accounts, a risky and unsafe business. 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of the paper ‘Which Pension?: mid-life women and pension 
choice in the UK’ presented to the IVth European Congress of Gerontology, Berlin, 7-11 
July 1999. 
Government changes to state pensions, the mis-selling of private pensions and the 
stealing of assets of occupational pensions have highlighted the risks we take as 
consumers of pensions. The marketisation of pensions in the UK, with its emphasis on 
private schemes, is part of the rolling back of the welfare state with risks and costs 
being passed on to consumers (Aldridge 1998). Thus UK governments in the 1980s and 
1990s are less willing to guarantee financial security during pension years (Falkingham 
1998). The effect of such policies on the pension provision and retirement income of 
women has been examined in an increasing amount of research (Davies and Ward 
1992, Ginn and Arber 1993, 1998, Groves 1991, Walker 1992).   Since women make up 
the majority of people of pension age, any negative outcomes of pension choices made 
at earlier stages of the life course disadvantage women disproportionately. This paper 
focuses on the ways in which women make decisions when confronted with pension 
options.  It investigates theoretical ideas about the decision-making process by 
examining the empirical data in the light of theories of choice, which emphasise a 
calculative, rational perspective and those which emphasise the place of ‘irrational’ 
behaviour. 
 The paper begins with an outline of theoretical perspectives on how individuals 
make choices in the face of risk.  This is followed by a brief discussion of how 
discourses associated with consumer choice have been incorporated into UK pension 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s.  I then turn my attention to my empirical study.  After a 
brief outline of the methods and data used I present and analyse the interview data. 
My conclusions return me to more theoretical issues and provide a context for 
reflection on how mid-life women negotiate risk and choice in planning their future 
pension incomes.  This leads me to qualify the notion of reflexive decision-making put 
forward by Giddens by emphasising the role of habitual action in decision-making. The 
paper concludes that the expansion of pension choice has been negative rather than 
positive, and thus is likely to lead to increasing poverty among women in later life. 
 
making choices in the face of risk 
 
If indeed we do live in a risk society, how do we make decisions when confronted with 
what Giddens calls  ‘panoramas of choice’ (1991: 139)?  For Giddens the key is 
‘reflexivity’, which involves the continual weighing up of different positions in the light 
of new information; reflexivity thus undermines the certainty of knowledge (1991:20).  
Consequently, individuals employ a ‘calculative attitude to the open possibilities of 
action’ (1991: 28).  To make choices often we need access to complex systems of 
information, thus reflexivity increasingly takes place through expert systems.  Since 
experts often disagree such systems are reliant on the trust of lay people. For Giddens, 
reflexivity can lead to the empowerment of individuals since they can ‘reskill’ while in 
the process of weighing up positions (1991: 138-9).  So, thinking about pension choice, 
marketisation is predicated on consumers who are active and informed and who do 
not just defer to experts (Aldridge 1998).  Thus individuals appropriate knowledge 
about pensions in order to make a decision. This notion of reflexivity is not without its 
critics. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) does not see the conscious and deliberate intentions of 
calculating (reflexive) individuals as an adequate explanation of how we make choices  
(Aldridge 1998).  His notion of the habitus, for example, points us to the pre-conscious 
non-reflexive ways in which people act. Chris Shilling (1993) describes the habitus as 
an internalised set of predispositions to act in certain ways, determined by the various 
factors consisting an individual’s social location. For Bourdieu, individuals acquire their 
habitus as part of their personal development within a social field, that is within a 
‘structured system of social positions [that] includes lifestyle, education and politics’ 
(Jenkins 1992: 84-85).  So, ultimately, for Bourdieu, it is the less than conscious 
dispositions of the habitus that produce actions (Jenkins 1992: 77), and not the 
calculations of the rational actor put forward by Giddens.  In a recent edition of this 
journal Alan Aldridge (1998) has shown that the concept of the habitus can be applied 
successfully to consumer behaviour in the area of personal finance.  I intend to show 
how the notion of reflexivity can be qualified with the concept of habitus to provide a 
useful model of decision-making in the field of pensions.  
 
risk and choice: pensions since 1988 
 
Changes to UK pension policy since 1988 have been defended by a rhetoric of choice. 
In the field of pensions the state has been declared a barrier to choice and freedom, 
and thus ‘the burden of the state’ was removed in order to maximise consumer power 
(Gabriel and Lang 1995). Thatcherite discourse relied on keywords like ‘choice’ and 
phrases like ‘power to choose’ (Phillips 1998: 854), and individual responsibility has 
become a prominent feature of social and political discourses (Smart 1999).  The 
emphasis is on the need to be self-sufficient and owe as little as possible to others 
(Leadbetter 1989). This rolling back of the state has meant that financial risks have 
been passed on to consumers (Aldridge 1998), and choice has been linked to notions 
of good and evil and right and wrong (Gabriel and Lang 1995). 
Employees paying National Insurance Contributions (NICS) have no choice but 
to make pension contributions.  However, within this constraint, since 1988 those 
with access to all second-tier pension options can choose between an occupational 
scheme, an Appropriate Personal Pension (APP) or to remain in the State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). To facilitate choice the 1988 legislation allowed 
employees to opt out of occupational pensions that had previously been compulsory 
and occupational pension scheme membership can no longer be a condition of 
employment (Reardon 1994)1.  Changes proposed by the present Labour Government 
will modify the available pension options to include the Second State Pension (SSP) 
and new stakeholder pensions (Secretary of State for Social Security 1998).  The new 
SSP will replace SERPS and will provide benefits superior to those of SERPS for those 
earning up to £9,000 a year (Agulnik 1999).  In the absence of an occupational scheme 
employers will have to offer new stakeholder schemes to their employees, who will be 
encouraged to opt into them if they earn £9,000 or more a year (Secretary of State for 
Social Security 1998). Thus it seems that the number of second-tier options will 
increase, covering the SSP, stakeholder pensions, occupational pensions and APPs. 
Choosing a pension is complicated and risky. APPs are money purchase 
schemes with no set relationship between earnings and pension since returns are 
based on contributions and investment performance (Waine 1995).  So, APPs are 
often inferior to salary-related schemes such as SERPS and many occupational 
schemes that provide a guaranteed link between pension and earnings.  However, 
since APPs are not tied to an employer they have been marketed as more ‘flexible’ 
and a better option for women, often against their best interests (Davies and Ward 
1992).  Between 1988 and 1993 incentives, such as tax relief (Waine 1995), along with 
the emphasis on choice meant that millions of consumers were encouraged to opt out 
of established state pensions and take out these new private schemes (Gabriel and 
Lang 1995).  However, by 1994, when regulations were tightened, there was a 
scandalous number of cases of mis-sold APPs where individuals were advised to take 
out, or transfer to, APPs that were wholly against their best interests (Your Pension 
1998). 
Pension choice has often been based on limited information, lack of 
knowledge and fear.  Fears about the future of state pensions has meant that many 
have switched from SERPS to non-state schemes (Vincent 1995). Occupational 
pensions are often taken up with very little thought, and scheme members have very 
little knowledge about them (Field and Farrant 1993, Williams and Field 1993).  So, 
the complex literature associated with occupational schemes does little to aid 
understanding (Field and Farrant 1993).  Only a minority of those with an APP feel 
they have a very good understanding of them (Williams and Field 1993) and the 
advice that women receive takes little or no account of their disrupted employment 
lives (Davies and Ward 1992).   
Pension choice is not available in the same proportions to all and the notion of 
choice is often meaningless to those with limited financial resources (Nettleton and 
Burrows 1998). Occupational pensions are usually the financially better option but 
women are less likely than men to work for an employer who runs a scheme (Ginn 
and Arber 1993, Peggs 1995). Moreover, low earners are likely to be better off if they 
choose to stay in SERPS than if they opt for an APP (Davies and Ward 1992) or more 
recently available money purchase occupational pensions (Hutton et al. 1995).  The 
present Labour Government states that ‘the pension system we inherited...risks 
leaving up to a third of future pensioners facing poverty’ (Secretary of State for Social 
Security 1998: 1, para 5). Since the majority of pensioners are women these negative 
effects are gendered. 
In summary, successive UK governments have emphasised the notion of choice 
in the area of retirement pensions. The expansion of choice, information and 
regulation means that individuals are likely to be held increasingly responsible for the 
pension choices they make. Since women, on average, have fewer pension options 
than men,  it is likely that they will be the victims of this ‘rhetoric of responsibility’ 
(Smart 1999: 89). The study that follows explores how a sample of mid-life women 
perceives the risks and choices associated with pensions. 
 
data and method 
 
The interviews presented below are part of a multi-method study carried out between 
1991 and 1995 into women and pensions.  The research examines structural features 
of women’s pension membership (in particular non-state pensions) in Britain using 
General Household Survey data, and provides insights into women’s perspectives on 
pensions using qualitative interviews. This paper is based on the qualitative part of the 
study, which aimed to identify perspectives on state and non-state pension 
membership and attitudes to future financial independence. Although the sample is 
not intended to be representative it provides valuable insights into the subjective 
understandings of a diverse range of interviewees. 
For this part of the study I interviewed 45 employed women aged 40 - 59.  This 
focus on employed women was necessary since contributions to second-tier pensions 
are confined to employees. The age range of 40 - 59 was chosen because many women 
of this age who have had children have a high level of labour market participation 
because their children have left the parental home (Arber and Gilbert 1992). 
The sample was gained using a snowball technique of gathering contacts from 
each interviewee.  I stratified the sample according to part-time and full-time 
employment since hours in employment impacts significantly on non-state pension 
membership (Ginn and Arber 1993, Peggs 1995). The sample consists of 30 full-timers 
(doing 31 or more hours a week) who were offered an occupational pension (15 had 
taken up the scheme and 15 had not).  An additional 15 were part-timers (doing up to 
30 hours a week) who were not offered  occupational scheme membership. The labour 
market characteristics of the sample are presented in table 1.  Twenty six of the 
interviewees were married.  The majority (43) of the women interviewed identified 
their ethic origin as white, one as black as one as Asian.  Consequently issues around 
ethnicity are not explored here. 
 
Table 1: Labour Market Characteristics of the sample by second-tier pension 
membership 
 
 Second-Tier Pension (n) 
 Occupational APP SERPS None 
Part Time Employed  
Full Time Employed 
0 
15 
6 
4 
4 
11 
5 
0 
Occupational Class* 
1. Managerial/Professional 
2. Routine Non-Manual 
3. Skilled Manual 
4. Semi Skilled Man/Service Occs 
5. Unskilled Manual 
 
4 
9 
0 
2 
0 
 
4 
3 
0 
2 
1 
 
4 
3 
0 
7 
1 
 
2 
1 
0 
0 
2 
Annual Earnings 
Up to £5,000 
£5001 - £10,000 
£10,001-£15,000 
£15,001+ 
 
0 
8 
6 
1 
 
4 
2 
3 
1 
 
3 
7 
5 
0 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
Total N 15 10 15 5 
 
* Using the Registrar General’s Occupational Classification (OPCS 1990) collapsed into 
five categories. 
 
I used open-ended, but focused qualitative interviews, since this allowed the 
women to expand more fully on their attitudes. I identified general topic areas2 which 
enabled the interviewee’s responses to determine topic order, the time spent on each 
topic and the introduction of additional issues. A grounded theory approach (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) was used so that, as new themes emerged, they were followed up in 
subsequent interviews.  The taped interviews were between 30 minutes and two hours 
in length and were conducted between May and November 1992. 
For all data analysis the researcher brings her or his own basic assumptions, 
patterns of thinking and knowledge gained from experience and reading (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990: 95). In interview data concerned with attitudes this is particularly 
problematic since issues of establishing equivalence of meaning between interviewer 
and interviewee must be addressed (Fielding 1993).  The grounded theory approach to 
data analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1990) and Agar’s (1986) analytical approach were 
particularly useful in this respect.  The interviews provided a wealth of information 
leading to the emergence of major themes. The themes drawn on here relate to the 
issues that affected women’s pension membership decisions, and the role that 
information and experts played in these decisions. 
 
women’s perspectives on pension choice 
 
Each interview began with a discussion about the interviewee’s pension membership.  
Thirty of the women were interviewed because they had all three second-tier options. 
Four of the 15 who had taken up an occupational scheme said that membership had 
been a condition of employment, before legislative changes in April 1988 prohibiting 
this practice. 
 
Jill3 ‘The actual job has always had a pension attached to it and it was 
compulsory at one stage, so I've always had it, so it was just part of the out-
goings of your salary, so we didn't really need to give it much thought’ 
(Occupational scheme member for 11 years4). 
 
Sally ‘When I started I was forced to join and I’ve never stopped since’ 
(Occupational scheme member for 15 years). 
 
Sheena ‘I didn’t choose to pay superannuation, it is compulsory.  I’m sure it just 
appeared on my wage slip, that they’d docked me so many pounds for the 
month’ (Occupational scheme member for 5 years). 
 
Since membership had not been a choice any risks associated with occupational 
schemes were not voluntarily taken.  However, although those who were compelled to 
join complained that they had received little information about the benefits of joining 
(discussed below) all felt grateful that they were now members.  
In assessing the risks associated with present employment a minority of the 
women saw taking a job with an occupational scheme, compulsorily or voluntarily 
attached, as less risky than taking a job that did not offer such fringe benefits. 
 
Ava ‘I wouldn't ever go into jobs that didn't have unions, didn't have pension 
schemes and didn't have health and safety.’ (Occupational scheme member for 
19 years). 
 
Sally ‘I wouldn’t get a job without a pension attached to it - but in my type of 
work a pension is always attached’ (Occupational scheme member for 15 
years). 
 
These women had all three pension options and the ‘calculative attitude’ posited by 
Giddens (1991: 28) is evidenced in these extracts. For these women, present and 
future risks were part of the same choice; employers who did not offer a range of 
fringe benefits were seen as risky employers, affecting present employment conditions 
and putting future retirement income at risk. The employment and pension options 
open to them and their perceptions of, and management of, the risks they associated 
with these options are established over the life course.  Their career patterns,  their 
location within social milieu and within networks of communication (Macgill 1989) has 
led them to expect, and strive for, a range of current and future benefits from their 
jobs.  However, not all the women interviewed had similar access to a range of 
options.  Most of the part-timers said that responsibilities for child care prevented 
them from considering full-time employment.  None of them were offered an 
occupational scheme and therefore had, at most, two pension options.  Those on 
earnings below the NIC level were not paying into SERPS and therefore could only opt 
for expensive personal pensions, contributions to which were frequently prohibitive. 
Liz ‘I would [join] now. I mean the occupational pension contribution area is 
always assessed according to earnings anyway and then it's backed up by a 
contribution by an employer, and if I had a full-time job now, I would be 
somewhat better off.  But I think I regard this job as temporary...If women saw 
themselves in that bread-winning role they would be planning ahead but all the 
time its second to caring we’ll never plan ahead’. (No second-tier pension, 
earnings too low for SERPS). 
 
Women with limited resources have limited choices. Women’s social location, which is 
determined by, for example, familial and financial constraints, the expectation that 
women’s primary role is located in the home, and changes in the labour market, often 
prevents those who are poorer from having access to a range of job options.  
Moreover, women’s notions of their roles operate at the pre-conscious level of the 
habitus, pointing to non-reflexive choices. Liz directs us to the problems associated 
with pension choice for women in a social system where women’s primary role is 
socially constructed as carer, where women see their primary role as mothers, but 
where the pension system is based on attitudes associated with traditional male 
patterns of employment. 
In 1988 occupational pension membership became voluntary and those who 
had been compelled into membership spoke about the choices they had made 
regarding this change. 
 
Dora ‘They had this big thing, didn’t they, about opting out.  To be honest with 
you I can’t remember why it wasn’t worth it for me’ (Occupational scheme 
member for 16 years). 
 
Myra  ‘...I’d been in this scheme too long to get out of it, it wasn’t worth it for 
me’ (Occupational scheme member for 2 years). 
 
This decision to remain with the current pension rather than transfer to a newly 
available option was reflected by APP members. 
 
Dawn ‘When they started it [the occupational scheme], I’d already got a private 
scheme, so I just kept going, and I thought it was stupid to transfer it’. (Offered 
an occupational scheme but already in APP. APP member for 2 years). 
 
Making a choice can be very difficult and littered with uncertainty (Melucci 1996). This 
difficulty is compounded where individuals are expected to take personal responsibility 
for the choices they make. Although some form of calculation might be used, the 
habitus often guides individuals into strategies of avoidance (Aldridge 1998). Aldridge 
remarks that in the field of personal finance such strategies include ‘avoidance of 
potentially disconfirming information’ (1998: 5).  So, individuals are often conservative 
when making choices.  In the complex field of pensions it can be easier to stick with 
the devil you know rather than the devil you don’t. 
The management of choice and risk is often based on trust (Giddens 1991). 
Concerning government policy Anna Coote suggests that ‘Trust has broken down 
because politics is characterised by secrecy, spin-doctoring and special pleading’ (1998: 
126). In the case of pensions, many people in the UK have chosen a non-state pension 
over a state pension because of a lack of confidence in government commitment to 
the state scheme (Vincent 1995).   Several of the women in non-state pensions stated 
that the risk of government changes to state pensions had affected their pension 
choice. 
 
Ava ‘It’s [SERPS] a con.  They couldn’t possibly pay out that over all those years.  
I knew when I left the civil service that they couldn’t possibly pay us, and they 
must have known it, so it is just another way of getting money into the Tory 
bloody coffers’ (Occupational scheme member for 19 years). 
 
April ‘At that time I'd been a member of the Labour Party for years and at the 
time I was quite het up.  It seemed that the contributory pension was not going 
to be continued, and it was going to waste away, and the Government was 
actually going to trash it.  There was a lot of talk of how useless it was, and it 
was a waste of money for the country, and everybody should be on their 
private pensions.  I felt it was literally giving your money to strangers, and you 
didn't know what those strangers were going to do with it, and they could be 
investing in something I am not happy with, but I wouldn't know.... I would 
want to know where the money went and this Maxwell thing is disgraceful’. 
(Offered occupational scheme but chose SERPS) 
 
Lack of trust in the commitment of governments to state pensions has assisted the 
drive to encourage people to transfer to non-state schemes. Nevertheless, problems 
with occupational pensions and APPs meant that most of the interviewees had 
misgivings about choosing a non-state scheme as well.  The Maxwell scandal has 
generated grave doubts about the safety of money invested in occupational pensions. 
The scandal of mis-sold APPs has further eroded public confidence in non-state 
schemes.    
Although trust had been knocked the notion of the moral imperative to take 
out a non-state scheme was remarked upon by a few of the interviewees. 
 
Wanda ‘People of my generation were the people who started to stand on their 
own two feet but we’re not like them young girls today who are brought up to 
think along those lines, not to rely on the state, to donate to a private pension.  
They ought to be obliged to pay so much to a private pension - they shouldn’t 
expect the government to fork out...I used to think I’d have the state 
pension...Until a few years back, women were going to get a state pension, but 
gradually the state is getting less.  But you can understand it because there are 
loads of people of our age who will be retiring, and there won’t be enough 
money in the kitty.  If you haven’t got a private pension you’ve had it’ (Offered 
an occupational scheme but chose an APP.  APP member for 1 year). 
 
The idea of individual responsibility has emphasised the need to be self-sufficient. 
Contrary to Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus as being formed during early socialisation, 
we come across some social fields only as adults (Jenkins 1992: 90).  The idea of 
individual responsibility became prominent in the 1980s and, as a result, some of the 
women had changed their minds about which pension option they should choose, the 
moral imperative being to choose a non-state scheme.   
 
choosing a pension: the role of experts and information 
 
For Anthony Giddens the ‘reflexive monitoring of risk’ (1991: 119) entails increasing 
contact with expert systems.  Since knowledge in late modernity is constantly revised, 
individuals often take expert advice to help them make decisions.  However, decisions 
rarely become ‘clear-cut’ as a result of such consultations since experts often disagree 
amongst themselves.  Giddens sees this as a site of potential empowerment for lay 
people since they can appropriate knowledge while trying to make a decision.  He 
states that ‘if a person takes the trouble to reskill appropriately, a reasonably informed 
choice can in fact be made’ (1991: 141).  Such a conception overlooks the ways in 
which individuals deal with information. Aldridge (1998) argues that much of the 
population does not possess, in Bourdieu’s terms, the ‘cultural capital’ (broadly the 
knowledge and proficiency needed to make a decision), to resist marketing strategies 
and to understand the literature put before them.  Aldridge concludes that lack of 
cultural capital ‘prepares [individuals] for co-operation in their own exploitation’ 
(1998: 1). This perspective does not attribute blame to individuals for the choices they 
make but rather asserts that cultural capital enables people who are ‘better informed’, 
‘better advised’ and have a more ‘sceptical habitus’ to make favourable choices about 
personal finances (Aldridge 1998: 21).  In this section I explore these notions in respect 
of the women’s perceptions of the pension advice they had received. 
 In the field of pensions legislative requirements demand that non-state 
pension providers issue explanatory material for potential members and members. 
The present Government argues that information is often of poor quality and thus 
concludes that ‘many people run the risk of making the wrong pension choices...’ 
(Secretary of State for Social Security 1998: 27, para 11).  The Government advises that 
‘It is important that consumers should exercise care in the choices they make’ 
(Secretary of State for Social Security 1998: 73 para 43), thus places emphasis that 
individuals are to be held responsible for their pension decisions.  Thus there is an 
emphasises on individual duty. 
Each interviewee was asked about the information and advice they had sought 
and received.  Along with written official information, the women sought advice from 
financial advisers, friends, colleagues and relatives, and some scanned newspaper 
articles  for information.  Most felt that the information they had received was 
extremely difficult to understand.  For the women who were offered an occupational 
scheme the decision about adopting membership was occasionally influenced by the 
information provided by employers.  However, only a minority (10) of all the women 
interviewed felt that they had adequate knowledge of pensions, ranging from knowing 
how much they could expect in retirement to knowing the details of all the options.  In 
most cases the women considered the information to be very poor indeed, and all felt 
frustrated about its shortcomings. 
 
Myra ‘I think you just got the forms telling you you were in a pension scheme in 
loads of jargon, that you didn't understand, and you just knew that it was going 
to come out of your wage, so you just accepted that x amount of money was 
going to come out every month.  I've got no idea how much I'll get.’ 
(Occupational scheme member for 2 years). 
  
Leigh ‘They did [send information] but it was very difficult to understand 
because they don't talk in a language you can understand.  They talk about 
what is going to happen when you're 60, and how much its worth, but it's still 
very difficult to understand.  They don't talk in basic language’. (Occupational 
scheme member for 3 years). 
 
Information received from employers before, and during, membership was considered 
by most to be equally difficult to understand.  The field of pensions is notoriously 
complicated and without understandable information it is difficult to comprehend how 
individuals can, in Giddens terms, ‘reskill appropriately’ to make ‘a reasonably 
informed choice’ (1991: 141). On the basis of problems with the information she 
received one interviewee transferred from her occupational pension to an APP, which 
is likely to be against her financial interests. 
 
Judy ‘I had the opportunity to join this [occupational] one here and everybody 
said how good it was, so after my six month trial period I was allowed to join 
the scheme, which I did, and when I tried to find out what it would be worth 
when I retired, I was having trouble finding out details, and since I knew I 
wouldn't be here for the rest of my working life, I felt it better to come out 
while I could still get some of the money back, and I could put it into another 
scheme [an APP]’.  (Offered an occupational scheme, transferred to an APP. 
APP member for 1 year). 
 
It is unlikely that an APP will provide as good a return as an occupational pension 
scheme.  Information and persuasion are inextricably linked in the world of personal 
finance (Aldridge 1998) with suppliers competing for willing consumers. Aldridge 
concludes that it is those who have access to cultural capital and thus are better 
informed who are able to resist such strategies (1998: 21).  In the ‘promotional culture’ 
(Wernick 1991) of pensions, experts are often seen as charlatans since trust has been 
seriously knocked by pensions mis-selling.  So how did the women choose among 
different APP providers?  Several had chosen on the basis of trusting the advice given 
by established insurance companies with whom they had dealt for other types of 
insurance. 
 
Wanda ‘Everything in life is a risk and so I’m really being rather naughty for 
taking a safer option with the [Insurance Company] but then I don’t have to 
worry.  I always like to know I’ve got my own bit of security and its important’. 
(Offered an occupational scheme but chose an APP.  APP member for 1 year). 
 
Sam ‘I did it (took out an APP) because the insurance man suggested it, and I’d 
been looking at the work’s pamphlet’. (Not offered an occupational scheme.  
APP member for 1 year). 
 
The ‘strong branding’ (Aldridge 1998: 12) of companies with retailing credibility, 
coupled with familiarity, induced a feeling of trust in the advice given by their advisers. 
However, many of these companies were implicated in the mis-selling scandal 
(Aldridge 1998) and women have been disproportionately disadvantaged by 
commission receiving pension advisers (Pensions Management 1992: 2).  Although it 
was the companies and advisers that were held to blame (Aldridge 1998) in the future 
the blame is more likely to be laid in the laps of consumers since safeguards have been 
tightened.  Thus the present Government concludes that individuals should be able to 
gain ‘information and advice from sources they can trust’ (Secretary of State for Social 
Security 1998: 85, para 2).   
Nevertheless it seemed that the upsurge in information resulting from the  
introduction of APPs had a positive impact on awareness of the need for pension 
planning, especially for those without an option of occupational pension membership 
who received no pension information from their employers. 
 
Simone ‘Its right to have a pension...All the media coverage of SERPS was 
raising the question.  I actually went to a bank adviser in the end and he set it 
all quite simply out on a piece of paper and we discovered which one had the 
best pension and we, [husband] and I, both got these pensions’. (Not offered 
an occupational scheme. APP member for 1 year). 
 
Kit ‘When they first came out [private pensions]...I actually did training with 
one company, and I had to show videos about benefits, and I had to show one 
on pensions, and that actually made me think, because pensions doesn't mean 
anything, but the video showed all the benefits to different types of people 
with pensions...but I couldn't take one up there, because I wasn't working 
enough hours’.  (Not offered an occupational scheme.  APP member for 1 year). 
 
Such ‘no choice situations’ are usually the province of the poor (Bauman 1998). 
Women are less likely than men to have access to financially superior occupational 
schemes, and to the information that accompanies them, and women in lower paid 
jobs are usually the most disadvantaged. 
 A minority of the women interviewed were better informed about pensions and thus 
had gained the cultural capital needed to make a more informed choice about pension 
options. This had been built up over many years since information had been gained from 
past employers, early in their careers, and thus could inform future pension decisions. 
 
Shirley ‘It's all part of your induction when you join the civil service.  I joined in 1969 
and I was sent off to do training and part of that was terms of employment and 
pension provision.  Before that, when I was 20, I joined a factory and I think you had 
to be 24 to join, and the question never arose because I left before then. When I 
joined the council they gave us lots of information about pensions’.  (Occupational 
scheme member for 1 year). 
 
Ava ‘My first job was nursing and it was a really good training hospital, and they had 
people in to advise you on bank accounts, because they preferred to pay into a bank.  
So that's how I found out all about bank accounts and pensions’. (Occupational 
scheme member for 19 years). 
 
Such information enabled Ava and Shirley to consider, in some detail, the pension options 
open to them and both were sceptical about the security of all pension options. The 
inadequate information and advice received by most of the women interviewed meant that 
they had not gained the cultural capital needed to make an informed choice, and thus the 
choices they had made could damage their finances in later life. 
 
discussion and conclusions  
 
In his work Anthony Giddens (1991) has suggested that the expansion of choice is one of the 
positive aspects of living in the ‘risk society’ we are said to live in. However findings from 
this study suggest that the expansion of choice, coupled with the marketisation of pensions, 
has led to increased confusion about which pension option to take.  Thus saving for future 
retirement has become increasingly risky. The material circumstances which contexualise 
the lives of the women interviewed affect the pension options open to them and the 
information they receive about pensions.  Since we live in a moral climate where we are 
expected to take more responsibility for own welfare, but where women are less likely than 
men to have access to more lucrative occupational schemes (Ginn and Arber 1993),  it is 
likely that women will increasingly bear the brunt of, what are seen as, bad pension choices.    
Giddens (1991) has emphasised the role of reflexive calculations in decision-making.  
Although the women interviewed made calculations about what they felt was the best 
pension option, this decision was frequently based on lack of adequate and understandable 
information. If pension choice is being made during mid-life a good choice is crucial since 
valuable contribution years have already been lost. However, like many of us, most of the 
women lacked the cultural capital needed to make an informed decision. This is not to 
apportion blame to them; it seems that written and verbal information about pensions is 
not designed to be consumed by lay people. Thus, without understandable information, it 
seems unlikely that they will be able to ‘reskill appropriately’ to make ‘a reasonably 
informed choice’ (Giddens 1991: 141).   In addition, information is often received as 
marketing strategies of pension sellers.  I agree with Aldridge (1998), those who are better 
informed and who have a  more ‘sceptical habitus’ are more likely to be able to resist such 
marketing strategies.  However, even if all the women in this study were better informed 
and all did posses a more ‘sceptical habitus’, the moral imperative to choose a non-state 
rather than a state pension would drive some with few options into ‘choosing’ an APP. 
Since the women interviewed live in a society that sees saving for retirement as a 
moral imperative it is not surprising that many of them, even those on very low incomes, 
took out non-state pensions.  Their decisions were often driven by  the habitus where 
notions of the need to rely on self rather than others are located.  In addition,  gendered 
notions about women’s primary role as carer, notions located in the habitus, affected, or 
had previously affected, most of the women’s attitudes to their paid work and their 
retirement.  To enable women to save more effectively for their pension years, ideas about 
the primary role of women as carers will need to be challenged more effectively so that 
women (and pension providers) can see the value of preparing for the future. In addition, 
pension policy will have to take more effective account of the realities of women’s lives and 
will need to steer pension policy away from traditional male patterns of employment. 
The notion of reflexive decision-makers posited by Giddens (1991) suggests that 
individuals can be held responsible for the pension decisions they make.  However, 
individuals are constrained by the pension options open to them, their material 
circumstances, their cultural capital and by having a  less sceptical habitus.  Thus a climate 
that emphasises moral responsibility, that emphasises the moral imperative to take out a 
non-state rather than a state scheme, where marketing strategies are used to sell pensions 
and where pension advice is often inadequate and confusing, the expansion of pension 
choice has had negative rather than positive effects.  This is likely to lead to increasing 
poverty among women in later life. 
 
Notes 
1 The present Government is discussing the possibility of reintroducing the regulation 
enabling employers to make occupational pension membership a condition of employment 
(Watt 1999). 
2 The topics covered biographical details, employment history, economic situation, past and 
present pension membership, access to pension information, knowledge about pensions 
and perceptions of retirement. 
3.All names are pseudonyms. 
4 For all interviewees duration of membership refers to length of time in present scheme. 
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Table 1: Labour Market Characteristics of the sample by second-tier pension membership 
 
 Second-Tier Pension (n) 
 Occupational APP SERPS None 
Part Time Employed  
Full Time Employed 
0 
15 
6 
4 
4 
11 
5 
0 
Occupational Class* 
1. Managerial/Professional 
2. Routine Non-Manual 
3. Skilled Manual 
4. Semi Skilled Man/Service 
Occs 
5. Unskilled Manual 
 
4 
9 
0 
2 
0 
 
4 
3 
0 
2 
1 
 
4 
3 
0 
7 
1 
 
2 
1 
0 
0 
2 
Annual Earnings 
Up to £5,000 
£5001 - £10,000 
£10,001-£15,000 
£15,001+ 
 
0 
8 
6 
1 
 
4 
2 
3 
1 
 
3 
7 
5 
0 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
Total N 15 10 15 5 
 
* Using the Registrar General’s Occupational Classification (OPCS 1990) collapsed into five 
categories. 
 
 
 
